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I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Schwebel, dissenting in Nicaragua v. United States, expressed
concern that customary international law, as interpreted in that case by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was not based on state practice,'
and did not "take account of the realities of the use of force in
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School 2005. A.B., magna cum laude,
Washington University 2002. Many thanks to Ambassador Emilio Cardenas, for whose semi-
nar, Terrorism and International Law, I wrote the paper that became this note. All errors are
my own.
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 168 at 345
(June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
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international relations."2 His charge that this could "detract" from "the
state of the law"3 invites the question of whether law-particularly
customary international law-should be descriptive of practice, or an
aspirational attempt to shape it.
Law that is descriptive of practice has the advantage of having peo-
ple already following it-and it lacks powerful enemies trying to
undermine it-and it therefore needs only moderate international coop-
eration to function as a tool for punishing opportunistic deviation from
the international order. On the other hand, by definition, it only induces
compliance with the existing norm, not progress toward a better norm.
Aspirational law has the positive attribute of trying to make the world a
better place, but is hard to implement, because many countries, possibly
powerful countries in the international mainstream, must be induced to
change their behavior. A law not generally followed may either be a
dead letter or an invitation to selective prosecution and suspicions of ul-
terior motives.4 With aspirational law, a similar problem arises: Should
international law be a set of bright line rules with no exceptions, or
should it take cognizance of the difficult situations in which states find
themselves?
This Note examines the effectiveness of diplomatic criticism in en-
forcing international law,5 particularly in the counter-terrorism (or anti-
insurgency) context. It is not concerned with determining what interna-
tional law does or does not "in fact" allow States to do in combating
terrorism and other existential threats.
It first lays out a framework for assessing the effectiveness of differ-
ent international legal regimes (Part II), and discusses international law's
effectiveness in setting incentives (Part III). It then discusses the chal-
lenge of counterterrorism to the prevailing regime (Part IV), and finally
applies the framework, by way of illustration, to the case of Israel (Part
V). Since international criticism is more important to the enforcement of
international law in this sphere than are scholarly (or perhaps even judi-
cial) pronouncements,6 this section focuses on international law in the
diplomatic, rather than adjudicatory, context. The conclusion (Part VI)
considers the general applicability of the lessons of the Israeli situation
and revisits the descriptive/aspirational dilemma.
2. Id. para. 155 at 332 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
3. Id. para. 155 at 332 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
4. See infra notes 33, 136 and accompanying text.
5. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25-26
(1990).
6. Because international criticism is a primary enforcement mechanism. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 7 (1987) ("social-
disapproval factor operates as a sanction"); Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under
International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 593 (1997).
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II. STATE PRACTICE AND THE TWo BODIES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law consists of two main bodies: treaty 
and custom. 7
Treaties' language, which is the basis of their interpretation,8 is
negotiated, and States choose whether to bind themselves to that
language. Custom is a more illusory source, based on a "softer"
collective consent of States, express or implied.9 Whereas treaties are
interpreted in accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,' custom is divined by judicial bodies almost as an issue of
fact." They also serve two distinct purposes: treaties provide a
mechanism for States credibly to commit themselves to a mutually
beneficial course of action 2 (like contract law in the private sphere);
customary law serves as a basis for policing norms that are not the
subject matter of treaties. Treaties, except to the extent that they codify
existing custom, represent a departure from custom, a stricter regime, a
conscious decision by States to bind themselves to something which is
mutually advantageous but not necessarily moral or necessary to the
7. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999); see also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 12-15, 25 (2001) (discussing sources of International Law in the context of the
I.C.J. Statute). There are indeed more sources of International Law than custom and treaties,
but it is useful to divide the law into "oral" and "written" types (custom and treaty), not only
because the I.C.J. in Nicaragua had to rely on custom divorced from treaty obligations, but
also because this is a useful line to draw in most legal systems, between the written law and
custom as a gap filler. Nicaragua, supra note 1, para. 69 at 422-23 (interpreting the United
States' multilateral treaty reservation); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
19 (1988) (discussing constitutional Protestantism and constitutional Catholicism, as regards
the role of unwritten law).
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT].
9. See BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 15; see also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional
and Modem Apprmaches to Customary International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757-59
(2001) (discussing custom as emanating from an uncertain combination of state practice and
opinion juris, citing various authors). But cf John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of
International Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433, 434
(1997).
10. BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 26; VCLT, supra note 8.
11. Custom is "proved" by establishing that a "rule has (1) been followed as a 'general
practice,' and (2) has been 'accepted as law.'" BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 15 (quoting the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060).
Anthea Roberts describes two distinct ways that courts may divine custom: the "traditional"
method that involves inducing law from actual practice, and the "modem" method that de-
duces law from statements. Roberts, supra note 9, at 758.
12. Treaties can be used for aspirational/signaling purposes as well, by writing them
vaguely and without a mandatory dispute resolution clause. See, e.g., The International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). This type of treaty might be better analyzed as a
political document than as law, which is not to say that it is not useful in interpreting law.
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stability of the international system. 3 Custom, by contrast, insomuch as
it takes its legitimacy from its basis in existing norms, should have no
claim to be aspirational.' Law whose existence depends upon it
reflecting actual, widespread practice cannot require that which is not
reflected in actual, widespread practice."
A. State Practice and Customary International Law
Customary international law takes its unique force from its norm-
enforcing nature. 6 Just as the common law's strength is in its reflection
of norms that have been tested, customary international law benefits
from not needing to be negotiated or drafted, 7 because it evolved in state
practice. Additionally, to the extent that people act in accordance with
legal dictates, the law is strengthened.' 9 Thus, custom's legitimacy and
efficacy depends upon its solid basis in state behavior.
1. Utility of Custom
Common law systems' advantage over other legal systems lies in its
ability to change, ° it is true, but also in its firm basis in actual practice,
and to the extent it deviates from it, in general recourse to the courts for
a variety of disputes so that the law can develop and react, so that it can
take reality into account.2' "Proper" customary international law is a
good gap filler 22 because it mandates only policies that have been shown
to work in most of the world.23 Moreover, because truly customary prac-
13. See BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 25-30.
14. Under the "traditional" view. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 758.
15. This follows logically. Custom, in fact, has sometimes been extended beyond actual
state practice. See Roberts, supra note 9. To the extent that custom purports to depend on
actual state practice, however, this should not happen.
16. See Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L.
101, 102 (1987). But see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 7, at 1129 ("[M]any apparently
cooperative universal behavioral regularities are illusory").
17. Not only for the time and effort it takes to do so, but more importantly for the guar-
anteed workability which is the natural product of trial and error.
18. See supra note 11.
19. Most obviously by adding to the history of consistent state practice, but also to the
extent that misbehavior might not be seen to be punished effectively.
20. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 222
(1999).
21. See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 Am. J. CoMP. L. 97, 98 (2002) (laws, institutions need "customers").
22. More than a tool for interpretation, which role is played by "General Principles."
See BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 13-14; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, art. 38(l)(c), 50 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
23. The degree of specificity of customary international law may be an issue, however,
as a custom of not engaging in certain activity (even under assuming that it is illegal) in most
circumstances does not mean that the activity would be considered illegal in exigent circum-
stances, as those circumstances may not have been considered. See Carsten Stahn, Agora:
[Vol. 26:869
State Criticism in Enforcing International Law
tices are already followed in most of the world, the cost of ensuring
compliance should be low.Y In this view, custom functions as a deterrent
to certain opportunistic behavior, not as a way to impose values that, as a
result of not enjoying international consensus, are not the subject of trea-
ties.25 Customary law, like common law, loses its unique efficacy when
the rules it imposes are based on abstract principles, instead of coming
from established norms.26
2. Legitimacy from Custom
That which is widely-enough accepted to be practiced by almost all
nations is easy to justify as law.27 Bans on practices, however, which,
while commanding universal negative lip service, are widespread, do not
reflect practice, lack legitimacy as law and may weaken the international
legal system by raising the specter of selective prosecution and by mak-
ing States less likely to agree to jurisdiction over international disputes
in general.28
Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict: Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 804, 819 (2003) (suggesting that principled differentiation after the fact among
uses of force could be applied to humanitarian interventions and serve as a means of gradually
reforming International Law on the use of force). Likewise, other states may have intended a
complete ban to which the state in question would not have agreed because it was the only one
likely to face such circumstances. This is not unthinkable since International Law is rife with
standards that are deliberately targeted at one or two countries. See Jeremy Rabkin, The Poli-
tics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC Debate, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
169 passim (2003) (describing the role of NGOs in shaping the Rome Statute to target Israel
and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention to make it harder for South Africa and
Israel to defend themselves); see also infra Part V.
24. The cost is lower because noncompliance is the exception, arising out of discrete
incidents of opportunism, rather than consistent, ingrained practices. Cf Curtis J. Milhaupt, A
Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture and the Rule of Law,
37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 3, 40 (1996) ("In highly relational contexts, which are characterized by
complex and undefined obligations, judicial enforcement of general legal principles to fill
gaps in incomplete contracts and to punish opportunism may be the most important function
of law.")(emphasis in original).
25. The process by which treaties come to embody custom (as in North Sea Continental
Shell) is properly understood to stem from the near-universal acceptance of the treaty, and
although it may seem intellectually dishonest to proceed as the ICJ did in Nicaragua, judging
on the basis of custom where a treaty (which for jurisdictional reasons could not be applied)
clearly controlled, it is not difficult to imagine that a long-standing nearly-universally accepted
treaty (in practice as well as in name) could at some point bind non-parties as customary in-
ternational law. See Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 81 (1996) ("[T]he determi-
nation of consensus among the states of the world has much to do with the formation of
customary law from treaty provisions...").
26. See supra notes 20, 21, and accompanying text.
27. This is because few will protest and because state practice is a legitimate source of
law. See supra note 11.
28. If a country suspects that a dispute resolution body will use custom to impose aspi-
rational norms on it, and if reservations are interpreted so as to be circumventable, then that
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Judge Schwebel's dissent in Nicaragua suggested, as discussed
above,29 that international law might be harmed to the extent it did not
comport to practice." Legitimacy is doubly important in a system with
few means of compulsion,31 and because a principal means of adjudica-
tion, the ICJ, is not mandatory, a skewed system of custom may impact
treaty law as well, by decreasing the number of States that agree to the.... 32
court's compulsory jurisdiction.
B. State Practice and the Legitimacy of
International Law in General
Laws that are not enforced across the board lose legitimacy as those
instances in which they are enforced are seen to be marred by political
considerations.33 The difficulty in international law of enforcing laws
across the board, caused by weak grounds of jurisdiction and by both
structural limitations and geopolitical considerations,35 makes more im-
portant the reflection of existing state conduct in international law in
general, not just in customary law.36 To the extent that law reflects prac-
tice, it does not suffer from this crisis of legitimacy. 7 Thus, international
legal regimes should have ease of enforcement, and its cousin, likelihood
of compliance, in mind 8
country may not agree to jurisdiction at all. See Richard Falk, Appraisals of Nicaragua v.
United States: The World Court's Achievement, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 106, 107-08 (1987). De-
spite the barely-disguised hopes of some, jurisdiction still requires state consent in most
international contexts. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 22, art. 36 (allowing treaties to refer mat-
ters for jurisdiction, and providing procedure for voluntary election of compulsory
jurisdiction). Cf. BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 20.
29. Supra Part I.
30. Nicaragua, supra note 1.
31. See FRANCK, supra note 5 passim.
32. States may also be tempted to explicitly exclude all custom from adjudications
under their treaties, which would tum International Law into private, rather than public, law.
See Falk, supra note 28.
33. This argument has its origin in domestic legal discourse and is particularly relevant
to the debate on racial profiling in the United States. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85
IowA L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (2000) (Racial profiling and selective prosecution undermine the
legitimacy "of all laws and all officials.").
34. See BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 241-46.
35. Structural limitations include the veto power of permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3). Geopolitical considerations include not wanting
to anger Pakistan, an ally in the hunt for al Qaida, with charges of human rights violations. See
Christopher Marquis, For Allies, ' Do' Becomes 'Hey, Want to Dance?', N.Y. TIMES, April 14,
2002, § 4 at 5.
36. See supra note 24.
37. See supra note 27.
38. One wonders whether compunctions over the Nuremberg Trials, in which people
were charged with violating laws that had not clearly been in existence (in any meaningful
way) when they acted (or at least were not deemed capable of individual criminal enforce-
[Vol. 26:869
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Even if existing state practice is too much of a limitation for treaty-
based international law, likelihood of compliance should be taken into
account, or at least its proxy in our model, reasonableness of compli-
ance.39 That is, a country should not have to refrain from defending itself
in order to comply with international law.4° The ICJ recognized the in-
herent conflict between reality and literal application of aspirational
norms in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.4' There, affirming the
principle that one may not threaten to do that which it is prohibited to
do,42 the court nonetheless maneuvered out of declaring a ban on the
threat of use of nuclear weapons, despite the threat of mutually assured
destruction, which is problematic with respect to International Humani-
tarian Law (IHL).4' The court recognized the "policy of deterrence" that
was central to international relations and found a way to avoid literalist
interpretations and refrain from issuing an advisory opinion that not only
might well have been ignored by all nuclear States,"4 but could also, if
actually complied with by some, have undone the global balance, result-
ing in humanitarian catastrophe. 5
ment), has led to the practice of banning everything, even without a useful enforcement
mechanism, all in the name of notice.
39. Even reasonableness may not always be appropriate. Even if one agrees with Mark
Bowden that some torture is a good thing, the only way to keep that slippery slope leading to a
Stasi prison is to ban all torture, even though some will continue, perhaps even hoping that some
will continue. Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, 292(3) ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51
(Oct. 2003), available at http:llwww.theatlantic.comlissues/2003/1Obowden.htm; see generally,
TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (collection of essays discussing the
acceptability of torture in extreme circumstances and the risk that legitimizing it at all could
leave it uncontrollable). Sometimes making restrictions mutually binding is the whole point
(as opposed to merely codifying an existing norm), such as bans on specific munitions. E.g.,
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800.
40. One could scarcely imagine that a risk-averse proto-nation, choosing from behind a
Rawlesian veil, would choose the international legal interpretation of today's Europe. See
JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). Even if she did, putting a country into
such a predicament would probably lead to her violating the international legal rule at issue,
giving up the opportunity in that case to moderate her behavior (assuming that a more limited
rule would confer some of the international public benefit of the stricter rule). This is not to
say that the law does not effect the state's deliberations, merely that it does not end up chang-
ing the outcome in this case. Cf Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 44 (1979)
(International Law influences state behavior by deterring violations).
41. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (I.C.J. advisory
opinion responding to General Assembly request) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion].
42. Id. at 246.
43. Id. at 256-60.
44. See Liz Heffernan, The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections on the Advisory
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 28 STETSON L. REV. 133, 169 (1998) (even
compromise opinion rendered may be ignored by the members of the Security Council).
45. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 41, at 830 96. It also would
have provided the Third World yet another rhetorical club with which to beat the West. Cf.
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS INCENTIVE
International law, whether customary or treaty-based, acts by impos-
ing costs on States for deviating from legal norms.46 States change their
behavior when the addition of these costs makes the total cost of acting
higher than the benefit 7 (which is equal to the cost of not acting). 8 If the
costs imposed by the legal system were equal to the social cost of the
behavior at issue, this would cause the acting state to internalize the ex-
ternal costs of its actions, leading to socially optimal behavior 9 which
could well involve breaking the law. ° For that reason, it may be optimal
to prohibit categories of activity across the board, even if sometimes it
will be socially optimal for them to be practiced,5' simply in order that
the acting State internalize the costs of its actions. 2 If the costs imposed
by the legal system are not in proportion to the external costs of potential
state action, however, there is the potential for over- or under-
deterrence. 3
Given the relative weakness of international pressure in the face of
grave threats to a nation's peace or security,5 4 it is likely that the external
costs will never be fully internalized."5 One might be tempted, therefore,
HENKIN, supra note 40, at 120 (United States and the West principal targets of Third World).
The I.C.J. also acknowledged that use of nuclear weapons might be legal for a state facing
annihilation. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 41, at 263 IT 96-97.
46. See HENKIN, supra note 40, at 44--45.
47. Id.
48. See definition of "opportunity cost" "opportunity" def. 11, OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY ONLINE, at http://dictionary.oed.com ("the loss of other alternatives when one
alternative is chosen").
49. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PRoc. 347, 348 (1967) (explaining externalities and the reasons for causing them to
be internalized).
50. Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
463, 479 (1996) (some offenses have negative net social value, but others' optimal level "can-
not be zero").
51. See supra note 39 (discussing torture as one such category).
52. See Demsetz, supra note 49, at 348.
53. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 237, 237 (2000) ("The economic theory of punishment in general ... is designed to
ensure optimal deterrence of private and public misconduct.").
54. See David J. Scheffer, Recent Books on International Law: Review Essay: Delu-
sions About Leadership, Terrorism, and War, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 209, 213 (2003) ("The
sharper edges of international law may need to be sanded down in order to protect the national
security and to defend a democratic way of life."); see also Daniel Rothenberg, "What We
Have Seen Has Been Terrible:" Public Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic
of State Terror, 67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 479 (2003) ("[Tjhe Guatemalan state committed itself to
combating the insurgency and defending its national security with little regard for interna-
tional law.").
55. See, e.g., Fred Weir, Russia Escalates its Air War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
28, 1999, at I (as many as 300 Chechen civilians dead); Peter Ford, Surveys Pointing to High
Civilian Death Toll in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2003, at 1; see also Scott
[Vol. 26:869
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to argue for always imposing the largest cost possible for each legal vio-
lation, on the grounds that it would cause the acting State to internalize
more of the external costs of the actions. This would be a mistake,56 for if
a State were choosing among possible reactions to a pressing threat,57
and it would receive the same rebuke for each, then state criticism under
International law will play no role in its decision-making process.
Imagine a hypothetical State that faces two equally effective choices,
A and B, in responding to a pressing threat. A is more costly to the State
in terms of resources and soldiers killed, but results in fewer civilian
casualties. B would harm far more civilians, but involves projecting
force from afar, with a lower cost to the State in both money and sol-
diers' lives. If other countries will condemn either action equally, 9 then
the State will choose whichever option, A or B, serves its own, domestic
purposes. If, on the other hand, other countries condemn B but not A, or
condemn B in more serious terms than A, 60 then if the difference between
diplomatically-imposed costs to the State of A and B is at least as great
as the difference in internal costs between the two, the State will choose
A and more civilians will be protected.6'
If the international community wants to influence state behavior
with its rules, so as to minimize civilian suffering, it should be careful,
lest the objects of its ire perceive a no-win situation, lest they choose to
ignore an undifferentiated international chorus that is all sticks and no
carrots. The relative costs imposed on States for the various options from
among which they choose is as important as the degree of those costs.
62
Baldauf, Afghan Violence Snares Civilians, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, August 21, 2003, at 6
(guerilla attacks kill more than 90, most civilians, in 10 days).
56. Assuming that the cost imposed is always the same, the result of the level of official
criticism, rather than a function of the degree of harm caused by the particular action, the
criticism serving primarily to publicize said action. If this is not the case, then publicity alone
should serve the same purpose, without the need for "legal" pronouncements.
57. That is, a threat pressing enough that the maximum available "penalty" would not
deter the best (from the state's point of view) of the possible reactions.
58. If the cost incurred is the same for each option, the state will be indifferent as to
which act it is penalized for, ceteris paribus.
59. That is, if the condemnations of each action impose roughly the same cost on the
State. I assume for purposes of this hypothetical that State knows the reaction other states will
have to each course of action. While this knowledge may not be as exact in the real world, the
deterrent power of state criticism depends on its existing to some degree.
60. Imposing a higher cost on the State if it chooses B than A.
61. Even though the State did not fully internalize the costs of its actions; here, one can
see that it is the relative cost that matters; see also text accompanying note 70, infra, on pro-
tecting civilians as the imperative of IHL.
62. If it is the difference in costs that will tip a State's behavior, then the least objec-
tionable option should not have any cost imposed on it at all. On the contrary, a benefit may be
conferred on the State that chooses that option, making the spread between it and the alterna-
tives even larger.
Spring 20051
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IV. COUNTERTERRORISM
Of much current interest in international law63 are the challenges in
applying iura ad bellum et in bello to the new class of low-intensity
state-party-optional warfare.64 Although these bodies of law predate
global non-state actors, the application of ius ad bellum-at least as it
concerns attacks on terrorist organizations and their property (even if in
the territory of a State not directly supporting them)-to counterterror-
ism seems logical enough. Non-state actors that "declare war" on States
should not complain when these declarations have their intended effect. 6
States that are unable (or unwilling) to control terrorist activity within
their borders may complain when their borders are breached, but nobody
listens.66 The inherent right of self defense would be meaningless if one
could not defend against non-state attackers.67 Moreover, it would be
perverse indeed for a legal system designed by and for States to allow
States to attack other States, but not to attack non-state entities.6 Gener-
ally, States will not stand idly by as their citizens are attacked, whether
by another State or by a non-state aggressor.69
63. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law,
and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004); Alan
Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 257 (Levinson ed., 2004);
David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299 (2000).
64. Low intensity war is nothing new, but efforts to protect non-state actors engaged in
them are both new and controversial. See Rabkin, supra note 23, passim.
65. Cf. Ford v. Douglas, 46 U.S. 143, *15 (1847) ("The maxim in equity is, a com-
plainant must come into the court with clean hands."). But see discussion of Hamas, Part V.B,
infra.
66. There was widespread condemnation of Israel for having violated Ugandan sover-
eignty by rescuing hostages that were being held with the tacit approval of Idi Amin. Paul
Fauteux, La Pratique du Droit Relatif au Maintien de la Paix et de la Sjcuritj Internationales,
47 REVUE DU BARREAU 644-46 (1987) ("Au Conseil de s6curitd la situation 6tait apparue
relativement claire ... [mais] un seul membre du Conseil appuya sur le fond la position ju-
ridique isradlienne[;] tous les autres jugeant que le raid dtait illegal ou dvitant de se prononcer
sur les aspects juridiques de l'affaire.") (citation omitted). Since then, the international con-
sciousness has changed (or has at least responded differently to similar American behavior),
with criticism limited to those who themselves harbor terrorists and whose territory is there-
fore the site of occasional counterterrorist military incursions. See, e.g., Syria's President Hits
at Attacks by US on Afghanistan, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, USA Ed. 1, at 1.
67. Cf. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law
of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 135, 137 (1987) ("[P]rimary rules" on the use
of force and self-defense "must be intrinsically compelling" or else "such rules would begin to
offend the rough intuitions of responsible politicians-who are concerned for the physical
safety of their own countries ... as to what kinds of principles they can live with.").
68. This may be precisely the goal of parts of the "Third World," at least with regard to
"wars of liberation." See TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 2 (2003)
[hereinafter IBA Report].
69. See Hargrove, supra note 67, at 137. Israel's inaction in the face of Scud missile
attacks from Iraq in the first Gulf War is a notable exception. It resulted from pressure from
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The restrictions of ius in bello, however, have an important role to
play in counterterrorism, mainly because its principle, to limit suffer-
ing," applies regardless of the reason for the conflict or the identity of
the players;71 where a legal criticism under ius ad bellum demeans the
justice of a State's cause72 ("You have no right to fight over this!"), a
criticism under ius in bello contains a different admonition 73 ("Do not let
unacceptable means pervert or cloud your just ends!"). As a minimum
standard of conduct that reaffirms the humanity of state actors, rather
than, as ius ad bellum, one that reflects an agreement whose utility lies
in its mutuality, ius in bello should be applied to all conflicts, even con-
flicts with entities that do not follow it.74 Moreover, given the
pointlessness of trying to maintain an erstwhile "peace" when an armed
attack is already underway (as would be the purpose of applying overly
formal interpretations of ius ad bellum based on state/non-state distinc-
tions), international law should focus its energy where it will be more
effective, that is on influencing the conduct of nations in the course of
wars that cannot be prevented.75
Washington, which alone might not have been enough, but for the Coalition's bombardment of
Iraq, which made Israeli retaliation superfluous. There are those who believe, however, that in
so doing, Israel lost deterrence. See Harvey Morris, Israel Might Refuse to Stay out of War on
Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, London Ed., at 7.
70. See IBA Report, supra note 68, at 91 n. 1 (preventing suffering is principle purpose
of IHL); Anne Marie Slaughter & William W. Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (Art. 2(4) "articulates a principle of civilian inviola-
bility'").
71. The specific rules, of course, do depend on the circumstances of the conflict, as
with the requirement that non-military combatants differentiate themselves from the civilian
population, Third Geneva Convention, art. 4(A)(2), but even this distinction is in furtherance
of the main purpose, preventing suffering, particularly among civilians.
72. See JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 182
(3d ed. 2003).
73. See id. at 183.
74. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 7 [hereinafter Geneva IV] ("No special agreement
shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present Convention,
nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them."). Since the restrictions are not contractual
in nature, they do not depend on reciprocity.
75. It has been argued that constraining states' forceful responses to terrorism will force
them to "resolve the root causes leading to terrorism' but this is fanciful. See Antonio
Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 589, 600 (1989). First, states are not constrained because international rules on the use of
force have no teeth (especially compared with the power of domestic demands for security).
See Falk, supra note 28, at 108 (noting "absence of any prospect of enforcement"). Second,
root causes are not always easy to identify or to remove. See Shashi Tharoor, September 11,
2002: Understanding and Defeating Terrorism, One Year Later, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
9, It (2003) (denying "simplistic explanations for the root causes of terrorism," but acknowl-
edging the role played by "the scourges of poverty, of famine, of illiteracy, of ill-health, of
injustice, and of human insecurity"). Third, it is not clear that having people ready to kill and
terrorize for a cause makes that cause legitimate. If one were restrained in the way he could
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A. lus ad Bellum
The ICJ's results-oriented exegesis of "armed attack" in Nicaragua
notwithstanding, 6 it is generally agreed that countries have the right to
defend themselves, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.77 Even
when the Security Council authorizes military intervention, a country's
resistance to that action at its borders would presumably not be termed
"aggression." 78 Moreover, international law stands to lose legitimacy
(and therefore efficacy as well)79 if it condemns as technically illegal,
acts of self-defense that are considered imperative for national preserva-
tion in domestic discourse and that are viewed sympathetically in
otherwise disinterested parts of the world.0 Use of ius ad bellum to re-
strain any but the most reaching reprisals may by weakening the law as a
whole, cripple it in the important arena of ius in bello8
1. Article 51 and the Inherent Right of Self Defense
The basic principle of modern international law respecting the use of
force is taken from Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.2 Article
2(4) binds all U.N. Members to resolve disputes peacefully and without
resort to the threat or use of force. This is an idealistic rule that works
well when everyone follows it.83 There is, however, a safety net, a right
of self defense that allows the use of force against States that cheat. '
act against a berserk who demanded his daughter and his property, there would be an increase
in berserker demands unless people stopped having daughters and property! See THE SAGA OF
GISLI, ch.I at 1 (1963).
76. Nicaragua, supra note 1.
77. In fact, the doctrine of necessity and proportionality in self-defense came out of the
Caroline case, in which non-state actors aided insurgents across international boundaries. See
John Bassett Moore, The CAROLINE Incident, 2 DIG. OF INT'L L. 412 (1906) (cited in
BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 214 n.1).
78. Aggression generally requires cross-border action. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Comm., 29th Sess., No. 86, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1975). The definition's catch-
all, however, could in theory be used to term such self-defense aggression. Id. at art. I ("or in
any other manner inconsistent...").
79. FRANCK, supra note 5, at 3 (legitimacy induces compliance).
80. That is, States might not see such criticism as legitimate. See id., passim.
81. See discussion of voluntary submission to jurisdiction accompanying note 28, su-
pra, and note 104, infra.
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 214-15.
83. The idea at the time, of course, was to bind all States to follow it. See IBA Report,
supra note 68, at 15. Since then, a greater (though not unrelated) threat to international stabil-
ity than opportunistic state actors has emerged-perhaps testament to the success of the U.N.
system. See id.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The right is described as "inherent," which may mean either
that it had to be included in the Charter but not that it extends beyond interpretations of article
51, or that its existence, while mentioned in the Charter, is independent and must be inter-
preted without reference to documents of man-made, as opposed to natural law.
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This strategic decision, which takes reality into account and does not
try to turn the U.N. Charter into a "suicide pact," must be upheld in ju-
risprudence if international law is to function as anything more than a
political battleground.85 Terrorists are the ultimate cheaters in the interna-
tional game"6 and they should not be permitted to hold the world in a
giant Guantanamo prison, a legal limbo in which the law says they can-
not be reached.87 Moreover, it may be argued that the inclusion of the
right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter, even in the aftermath of a war
so horrific that nations might have been persuaded to sign on without it,
reflects the awareness that in the future, a State would be attacked and
would defend itself, the text of Article 2(4) notwithstanding." If the U.N.
Charter was to be something more than an ode to idealistic international
relations, it would have to take account of the extent to which that state's
actions could be influenced, 89 and also of the probable reaction of other
countries if they saw the international legal system condemning actions
In the name of the "overall spirit" of the Charter, which is to promote peace, there has
been a tendency to use the U.N. in order to constrain the use of force without addressing its
frequent 'root cause,' namely the indirect use of force by others. See Charlotte Ku, When Can
Nations Go to War?, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1077, 1078 (2003) ("[T]he U.N. Charter system as
a means to restrain the use of force has perhaps developed more fully than the Charter sys-
tem's ability to authorize and to enable states to use force in situations other than a clear cross
border invasion of a member state.") (emphasis in original).
85. See supra Part 1VA.; see also George Schultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Chal-
lenge of Ambiguity, 25 I.L.M. 204 (1986) (January 15 address of the Secretary of State) ("The
UN Charter is not a suicide pact."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60
(1963) ("The powers of Congress to require military service for the common defense are
broad and far-reaching, for while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact. Similarly, Congress has broad power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign affairs. Latitude in this area is
necessary to ensure effectuation of this indispensable function of government.") (emphasis
added, footnotes omitted). Louis Rene Beres has also used the phrase "suicide pact" in this
context. Louis Rene Beres, Palestinian Atrocities, Israeli Retaliations and the Laws of War,
ISRAEL INSIDER, Mar. 11, 2002 ("International law is not a suicide pact."), available at
http://www.israelinsider.com/views/authors/beres.htm.
86. See discussion infra accompanying notes 121-130.
87. The United States argued that the detention center at Guantanamo Bay was a legal
limbo where U.S. courts could not venture. Rasul v. Bush, Brief of Respondents, 2003 U.S.
Briefs 334, *9-*10 (March 3, 2004).
88. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 259,
265 (1989) (States justify their actions in terms of art. 51, but its effect on their actions is
uncertain).
Article 2(4) reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art.
2(4).
89. An international legal system with teeth could well encourage a state to refrain
from defending itself, analogously to Israel when it was attacked during the first Gulf War. See
discussion supra note 69.
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they felt were justified.90 The legitimacy of international law depends on
its being enforced and on the reasonableness of its dictates. 9' Telling
countries to turn the other cheek or replacing self-defense with General
92Assembly resolutions, seems unlikely to further that aim.
2. Responsibility to One's Citizens
Democratic States exist in order to solve collective action problems
and improve the welfare of their citizens. 93 They monopolize the use of
force to some extent, and they promise peace and security in return. Part
of the responsibility inherent in a monopoly on violence is the obligation
to protect one's citizens.94 The extent to which this obligation may be
derogated from in advance, through the familiar contract/treaty notion of
pre-commitment, is debatable.95 In any event, for this analysis, the most
relevant point is that a healthy democratic country has in place a system
of political and social institutions that compel the leadership to act to
protect the citizenry.96 If this is the case, then international law, which in
the public sphere is mainly a foil of legitimacy for parties to wield, 97
90. The reaction of a country to mistreatment of a peer country is one thing; interna-
tional scapegoating of a unique state, however, is another matter entirely. See Robert J. Beck
& Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us:" International Law and Forcible State Re-
sponses to Terrorism, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 153, 195 (1994) ("[1]t is difficult to measure the
degree to which condemnations of Israeli and U.S. actions have been based on the nature of
the acts, and the degree to which such condemnations have been based on the nature of the
actors themselves. During much of the Cold War period, both Israel and the United States
were fairly regularly attacked in international fora. It would seem likely, therefore, that geopo-
litical and ideological considerations informed at least some international criticism of counter-
terrorist operations in addition to strictly legal concerns.") (emphasis in original).
91. See FRANCK, supra note 5.
92. Some think that G.A. resolutions are useful. See, e.g., Alain Pellet, Book Review:
Bruno Simma et al. eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 135, 144 (2003) (chastising the General Assembly for its silence after the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003).
93. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 98-102 (1971).
94. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or
their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duly to Protect
its Citizens, 15 TEFMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 232-33 (2001).
95. See supra Part IV.A, discussing inherent right of self defense. In any event, it is
doubtful if a previous generation can be held to have signed away a later generation's right to
exist (the later generation certainly cannot be seen to have knowingly ratified this arrange-
ment). Cf. RAWLS, supra note 40. Yet, this is exactly the situation that would obtain if
international law were permitted to be interpreted as a suicide pact, banning self-defense in the
face of terrorism. Cf. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (at least in sphere
of immigration, government cannot bind itself irrevocably).
96. See Alfred P Rubin, Legal Responses to Terror: An International Criminal Court?,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 68-69 (2002) (pointing out the seeming incongruity in punishing the
head of state for actions which were to some extent dictated by domestic political forces).
97. See Schachter, supra note 88, at 263 (community judgment enforces rules on the
use of force).
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would in denying self-defense in this instance stand in opposition to
the practice of States and become about as persuasive as quoting
Corinthians to the Taliban.
3. Necessity and Proportionality
Since, as discussed above, States must have the ability to defend
themselves, even from unconventional threats, most of the work in ap-
plying ius ad bellum to counterterrorism, to the extent we are bound by
rubrics rather than abstract principles," must be done by the principles of
necessity and proportionality.99
The question, then, is how to apportion the burden of proof between
the party asserting self-defense (the defending state) and those who chal-
lenge its claim.ia The structure of the U.N. Charter, where Article 51
constitutes in essence an affirmative defense to violations of Article
2(4), '°' may best be interpreted as placing the burden on the defending
State, especially in light of the requirement that it notify the Security
Council of its actions.' °2 A more broad view of the institutional context
of the U.N. Charter, however, taking into account the lack of an en-
forcement mechanism other than Security Council action,' °3 may
commend a different reading. To the extent that countries did not agree
to ICJ or other jurisdiction over claims of self-defense, '°4 it may be ar-
gued that they were not really agreeing to an allocation of the burden of
proof, but rather were agreeing to a general principle and counting on a
procedural nullity. Self-defense, like many international legal principles,
is principally a legitimating ground for defending ones actions in the
98. See infra Part V. They are not bad principles, incorporating, as they do, a balancing
standard. They can be misapplied, however, by framing the choice as that governing the
smallest possible action-unit, rather than an overall military strike.
99. Supra note 77, (Caroline case establishing these principles).
100. See, generally, Sara N. Scheideman, Note, Standards of Proof in Forcible Re-
sponses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249 (2000).
101. Analogous to violations of various GAlI" provisions which are excused in accor-
dance with Article XX. See Robert Housman & Paul Orbuch, Integrating Labor and
Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 719, 745 n.121 (1993).
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
103. Which is unlikely in conflicts involving any of the Security Council's permanent
members (or their clients).
104. As with the Vandenberg Reservation at issue in Nicaragua (61 Stat. 1218, reserva-
tion (c) (1947)). Moreover, as the decision in Nicaragua showed, I.C.J. opinions can be both
political and results-oriented. On supreme courts as political institutions, see, generally, Gad
Barzilai, The Center Against the Periphery: The Law of "Terror Prevention" as Politics (He-
brew), 8 PELILIM 229 (1999); Eitan Barak, Under Cover of Darkness: The Israeli Supreme
Court and the Use of Human Lives as "Bargaining Chips," 3 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1999).
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diplomatic arena,' °5 which means that there is no fact-finder whom the
defending State must satisfy-rather, there is a community of nations
which will pretend to believe or disbelieve it based on geopolitical con-
siderations.' 6
B. Ius in Bello
There are two types of moral standard: that applied within the moral
community,10 7 whatever its delimitation, which is based on reciprocity
and centers on the effect on others of ones actions, and that applied
more-or-less universally, which is based on the actor's humanity, more
on what the action says about him than on its effect on others.0" This
latter, universal morality, is behind those who would guarantee basic
human protections to terrorists, even if not applying technical protec-
tions of the Geneva Conventions (such as conferring status as prisoners
of war).' 9
When applying any provision of IHL to anti-terror campaigns, it is
important to call attention to the reason behind the protection. Good rea-
sons may help convince well-meaning States to abide by the most
important restrictions and will outflank the objection that counterterror-
ism is different."0
1. Geneva Conventions
If one is concerned with making sure that those caught up in an anti-
terror dragnet are guilty, then there is reason to apply rules of due proc-
ess. If one is concerned that a moral State ought not torture human
beings (or animals, for that matter), then enforcing humane treatment of
prisoners in all circumstances makes sense. If one is concerned with up-
holding the letter of international agreements written in the aftermath of
other types of war, however, then it must be asked what is to be gained
105. See supra note 97. This is natural for the charter of an organization that is essen-
tially diplomatic and not judicial.
106. See supra note 97.
107. Terrorists are generally considered outside the moral community, even if the groups
from which they arise are or were within it. Cf Barzilai, supra note 104, at 248 ("terror pre-
vention" used to marginalize otherwise legitimate political discourse).
108. See Brian Barry & Matt Matravers, Justice, international, in ROUTLEDGE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1998)(comparing international justice to domestic justice on the
basis of the extent of the moral community) at http://www.rep.routledge.com/.
109. See IBA Report, supra note 68, at 96 (Guantanamo prisoners to be treated hu-
manely); id. at 91-92 (reluctance of some, including United States, to extend IHL protections
to terrorists who do not obey them).
110. See IBA Report, supra note 68, at 91 (countries tempted not to apply IHL to terror-
ists).
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from their strict application here."' By the same logic, if a conflict in
which terror is used is marked by mutual respect of certain principles,
such as the humane or respectful treatment of prisoners, then it would
behoove States to conform to such norms, even if a correct reading of the
Conventions would not require them to do so.
States must not be allowed to avoid important international legal
constraints by arguing that the Conventions do not imagine a modern
global terrorist threat and accordingly, do too much to curtail effective
action against it," 2 because that would eviscerate humanitarian protec-
tions. Rather, by tailoring the rules to the reasonable needs of threatened
States, international law can dodge this attack and continue to be an im-
portant force for minimizing human suffering in war.
2. The Essential Command of IHL
The purposes of IHL are: (1) to prevent suffering;"' and (2) to make
all players in the international game better off by mutually agreeing to
limit war to certain bounds."' Where reciprocity is nonexistent, we are
left with preventing suffering as IHL's raison d'etre. There are two facets
of preventing unnecessary suffering. One is preventing certain levels of
suffering in all (or almost all) cases, which is why torture is unaccept-
able.' 5 This applies specifically to the guilty, to unlawful combatants, to
those who do not abide by the same rules. The other is preventing any
suffering of non-combatants, 6 which is more like a due process, protec-
tion of the innocent concern.
Too often, this essential command is either pushed aside by literal-
ists or, even worse, applied only to one group of civilians, ignoring
111. There may be much to gain, if one is convinced that in the absence of strict rules
there are no real protections. Relying on strict legal interpretation, rather than on moral and
policy considerations, will lead to gaps in coverage, as in the Palestinian territories, to which
the Conventions, by their terms, do not apply. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 2;
Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 IsR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 262-65 (1971); see also Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner:
Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 IsR. L. REv. 279, 294 (Laws of belligerent
occupation that assume existence of another legitimate sovereign do not apply to West Bank.).
But see Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 68 (2003).
112. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Decision re Application of the Ge-
neva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, to the
President 2 (Jan. 25, 2002)("In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's
strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions
requiring that captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary privileges .. ") avail-
able at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/.
113. See supra note 70.
114. See supra Part II (discussing treaties as contracts).
115. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
116. Geneva IV, supra note 74.
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another."' In addition, countries, motivated by strategic or political inter-
ests, may choose the argument that they feel most limits their
adversaries' behavior. If the effect is that some defending States hear
criticism with which they cannot comply, presented as international law,
the world will lose the opportunity to use the law to influence their be-
havior so as to prevent suffering."
8
V. ISRAEL
Israel, threatened continuously by terrorist attacks," 9 has been beset
by hostile violence since before its inception.'2° Attacks have violated
international law in many ways: using children not merely as soldiers but
as "martyrs;"' 2 ' deliberately targeting civilians;2 2 manufacturing weapons
to cause both maximum destruction and maximum suffering,2 as by the
inclusion of nails,'24 screws,2 2 and anticoagulants; 2 6 using ambulances to
smuggle explosives;' 27 using Palestinian civilians as human shields;' 28
using violence to derail peace negotiations rather than in self-defense;' 29
and most sinisterly, having "ethnic cleansing" as a goal.'30
117. See Asa Kasher, Those Who Cry with One Eye, HAARETZ ENG. ED., Feb. 29, 2004
(chastising both sides of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict for 'crying with one eye'), available at
http://www.haaretz.conihasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml ?itemNo=399254.
118. See supra Section II (discussing international legal criticism as a means of imposing
costs on undesirable state behavior).
119. See Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Victims of Palestinian Violence and
Terrorism Since September 2000 (official Israeli government list f victims of Palestinian vio-
lence, with date, place and cause of death), at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims%20of%20Palestinian%20Violence
%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc.htm (accessed 2/3/05).
120. See, e.g., Tel Hay, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, at http://search.eb.com/
eb/article?tocld--9071571 (village sacked in 1920, leaving 6 Jews dead); Hebron, ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, at http://search.eb.com/eb/article?tocld=9039765 (last visited Mar. 26,
2005) (67 massacred in Hebron in 1929).
121. Justus Weiner, The Use of Palestinian Children in the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Legal and
Political Analysis, 16 TEMP. INT'L & Coa. L.J. 43, 51-52 (2002).
122. Clyde Haberman, At least 14 dead as suicide bomber strikes Jerusalem, N.Y. TtMES,
Aug. 10, 2001, atAl.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Greg Myre, Gaza Mother 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
15, 2004, atA3.
126. Ian Fisher, For Israelis Wounded in Bomb Attacks, Recovery Is a Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2002, at A6.
127. Serge Schemann, Mideast Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2002, at A1.
128. See Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Re-
strictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 445 (2002); cf Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 28 ("The presence of a protected
person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations'").
129. Serge Schemann, Israel-P.L.O. Deal Reported on 1998 West Bank Pullout, Easing
Way to Hebron Pact, N.Y TIMES, January 13, 1997, atAl.
130. See Mark D. Allison, Note, The Hamas Deportation: Israel's Response to Terrorism
During the Middle East Peace Process, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 416 (1994).
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Israel, as a State founded in the aftermath, and in part by survivors,
of the Holocaust,' has morality as a substantial part of its conscious-
ness.'32 As a State continually faced with existential threats,'33 however, it
has often taken a somewhat limited view of the moral obligations of a
State towards its enemies and towards its adversaries. 34 Given the extent
to which international legal "rules" have been drafted by its enemies,
Israel's blind acceptance of those "rules" could be hazardous. 35 If one
extends those "rules" to include criticism by "human rights" organiza-
tions' 3 6 and European States,'37 the situation is even worse.
Israel's army, often criticized,'38 is subject to moral constraints as se-
vere as any other army facing terrorist threats. 39 Its morality, however, is
131. Israel, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, at http://search.eb.com/eb/
article?tocld=9106444.
132. Shamgar, supra note 111, at 277 (Israeli Attorney General-later Chief Justice-
wrote, "we do not content ourselves with the norms followed by others"); Israel at
56, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 25, 2004, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?
pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull%26cid=1082891657204 ("Our greatest success-
however ironically, given the way we have been vilified-is not material but moral."); see also
Kasher, supra note 117 ("The State of Israel, as a democracy, has the duty to provide its citi-
zens with effective protection of their lives and must give expression to human dignity of all
human beings, even if they are strangers or hostile.").
133. See James Bennett, Mideast Balance Sheet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at Al ("In a
fight combining a terror campaign with a guerrilla war, some Palestinian groups, such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are out to destroy the state of Israel."); World Briefing, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2000, at A16 ("Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, [Iran's] supreme leader, called for the destruc-
tion of Israel...").
134. See Meron Benvenisti, Still Shooting and Crying, HAARETZ ENG. ED., Mar. 12,
2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=
403928 (arguing that military ethical codes are "intended to cloak a brutal, cynical and ma-
nipulative system in a mantle of respectability" by promoting a false dichotomy between the
moral choices an army makes and the political dictates it is given). I do not suggest that Is-
raelis have never committed atrocities, as some did, for instance, at Deir Yassin in 1948. See L.
Carla Brown, State of Grace? Rethinking Israel's Founding Myths, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 90
(1998). In fact, some unacceptable behavior (which probably does not rise to atrocities) cer-
tainly continues. See Activists Say Border Police Held Boy, 13, as Human Shield, HAARETZ
ENG. ED., April 23, 2004 (stone thrower apprehended and tied to hood of Jeep as punish-
ment/protection from other stone throwers), available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=418705.
135. See Rabkin, supra note 23, at 758 (First Additional Protocol drafted in part by PLO
and ANC and directed at Israel and South Africa).
136. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) spends much of its
time criticizing Israel, ignoring other, more serious human rights situations in the world. Anne
F. Bayefsky, Israel and the United Nations'Human Rights Agenda: The Inequality of Nations
Large and Small, 29 ISRAEL L. REv. 424, passim (1995); see also Amnon Rubinstein, The
Counterfeit Human Rights Industry, HAARETZ ENG. ED., Mar. 21, 2004 ("Nobody protests
against the fence that Saudi Arabia is building on its border with Yemen-against international
agreements and harming thousands of shepherds whose flocks graze on the lands were [sic]
the fence is going up, but there is no organization that does not protest against Israel."), avail-
able at http:/lwww.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo-406813.
137. See infra notes 202-203.
138. See infra Section V.A.
139. See Implementation of International Humanitarian Law at the National Level with
Special Reference to Developments of Modern Warfare: National Report Israel, 28 REVUE DE
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for the most part Utilitarian and not Kantian, which may be part of the
reason for international criticism of it. 140
Having been the punching bag of the cold war'4 ' and of Arab frustra-
tion,'4 2 but no less committed to morality and to its goal of being "a light
unto the nations," Israel has looked inward for standards of conduct and
moral judgment. 143 Far from the crude bombing campaigns of Russia in
Chechnya,' 44 or the massacre at Hama in Syria, 4 1 Israel has sought to
balance its need for security against the suffering of Palestinians.' 6
Presumably, foreign countries' goal in criticizing Israel is to promote
"better" conduct by imposing a cost on allegedly illegal activity.'47 If this
DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 217, 219 (1989) ("A soldier who does not
comply or is even negligent in complying" with the Geneva Conventions, which are part of a
standing IDF order, "is liable to imprisonment."); id. at 226 (detailing the role of legal advi-
sors prior to military action and on the ground during combat); but cf Barak, supra note 104,
passim (condemning the political decision of the Israeli Supreme Court to allow the govern-
ment to use hostages taken by security forces as bargaining chips).
140. For an interesting comparative philosophical analysis of counterterrorism in Israel
and its relation to international law, see Gross, supra note 128, passim (arguing that rule of
law is the moral rubric by which any action of a democratic state must be judged). It has also
been suggested that criticism of Israel is a salve for guilty Europeans who seek to mitigate
their continent's behavior in the Holocaust by saying, "look at the Jews; when they are in
power, they act just as we did." See, e.g., Eric Yoffie, Build Coalitions of Decency to Fight
Hatred, FORWARD (Eng.), Nov. 14, 2003 ("And in Europe, which bears the mark of Cain for its
complicity in the Holocaust, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become a means of absolving guilt.
In turning the Israelis from victims into Nazis, they seek to cleanse their consciences by cast-
ing their sins upon us.").
141. Beck & Arend, supra note 90, at 195.
142. See id.
143. See supra note 132.
144. See Jonathan S. Landay, Chechnya Bomb Threaten U.S.-Russia 'Engagement,'
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Sept. 30, 1999, at 2; Michael Wines, In the Remains of Grozny, the
Remains of Living, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 4, 2001, at A3.
145. See John Kifner, Syria Said to Raze Part of Rebel City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1982,
at Al ("Casualties put in thousands").
146. See H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel (ordering
change to route of West Bank security barrier to alleviate Palestinian suffering, even though
new route admittedly not as good); see also Tuvia Blumenthal, Targeted Killings Can Save
Lives, HAARETZ ENG. ED., Mar. 16, 2004 ("[Wjhen the subject is the ethical code of an army,
and in particular an army that is waging a prolonged war against terror, it is not possible to
evade cold calculations and considerations, not when there are dead and wounded on both
sides of the equation.").
147. See supra Part III. Arab states would not fall in this group, to the extent their in-
volvement was intended solely to support the Palestinian national cause, regardless of Israeli
security policy. Also, some anti-Israel sentiment in Europe borders on the pathological, and is
divorced from the situation on the ground. Claude Lanzmann, Les D9lires de la Haine anti-
Israilienne, LE MONDE, May 10, 2002, at 1. One should also consider, however, the obliga-
tion that states have to "ensure respect for" certain international legal instruments. See, e.g.,
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 71, art. 1.
Sometimes, when Israel makes an argument in its defense, it is described as tricky or
clever. International condemnation of Palestinian terrorist attacks must be the result of Israel's
sophisticated P.R. machine. A French journalist observed that Palestinian lies are simple and
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criticism is seen by Israel (or other countries) as either not being based
in law, or imposing broad prohibitions that do not recognize efforts to
comply within the constraints of critical national interest, then the effect
of this criticism could be to weaken the authority and legitimacy of in-
ternational law and to leave human rights conditions in the territories to
Israeli judgment alone.14 1 It is not clear, however, if this in fact occurs.
A. Risking Soldiers'Lives to Protect Foreign Civilians: Jenin
In April of 2002, as part of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli
Army (IDF) cornered hostile armed men in the Jenin refugee 
camp.149
easy to pierce, while Israeli lies are "much cleverer, more sophisticated." Toine van Teeffele,
Israelis Better at Manipulating Media, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://english.aljazeera.net/
NR/exeres/0944B35C-4811-4F44-88EF-F96684DF85F7.htm. More specific to the current
conflict is the assertion that Israel is omnipotent and could stop terrorist attacks without hurt-
ing Palestinian civilians if it wanted to do so. Clues to this are found throughout transcripts of
interviews with victims of Israeli military actions, painting Israeli soldiers as all-powerful
sadists. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution ES-JO/JO (Jenin Report), July 30, 2002, U.N. Doc. no. A/ES-10/186 (2002), re-
printed in 41 I.L.M. 1444, 1464 (2002) [hereinafter Jenin Report] ("The Israeli occupying
forces had complete and detailed knowledge of what was happening in the camp through the
use of drones and cameras attached to balloons that monitored the situation, indicating com-
plete control of the situation by the commanders and that none of the atrocities committed
were unintentional.") (emphasis added); id. at 1463 (alleging those killed were first captured);
id. at 1468-70, Jordanian Note Verbale (detailing total personal control over even the most
pathetic characters, including control over bodily functions); id. at 1471 (alleges soldiers shot
a man "even though he had not kept them waiting"); id. at 1472 (child killed by direct hit of
shell, turned completely into a cinder; "Clearly, those operations were planned in advance
with the aim of wiping out men, women, children and buildings, in other words, all living
creatures and anything that could remain standing."); id. at 1473 ("They were not satisfied
with destroying our houses; they also placed mines everywhere, so that our lives are con-
stantly threatened," essentially a charge that the IDF sought to control every aspect of
Palestinians lives even after withdrawal). In fact, houses had been mined by Palestinians to kill
Israeli soldiers. See James Bone, Palestinians Share Jenin Blame, UN Finds, TIMES (London),
Aug. 2, 2002; see also James Bennet & John Kifner, Israel Presses on with Attacks, Focusing
on Northern West Bank, N.Y TiimEs, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al ("Palestinians [in Nablus] say they
have rigged the narrow streets and tunnels of the casbah with bombs and booby traps.")
There may be several reasons for these charges. One is simply a hyperbolic attempt to es-
tablish personal and state responsibility. Also, it may be a salve to Arab honor to characterize
Israel, whom the Arabs have not vanquished, as endowed with almost supernatural abilities.
This, in fact, was a part of Israeli deterrence until the first Gulf War. See supra note 69. What-
ever the reason, however, it is helpful to remember that, as shown above, there is more behind
many of the charges leveled against Israel than fact or law, and this fact should serve to cau-
tion us against considering Israel a typical case.
As this Note went to press, international (particularly European) criticism of Israel de-
creased markedly, coinciding with the improved situation in Israel/Palestine following Arafat's
death and an extreme decrease in terrorist attacks. This suggests that the purpose of interna-
tional criticism may not have been to enforce the law, but rather to force a return to the
negotiating table.
148. See supra Part III; see also FRANCK, supra note 5.
149. See Jenin Report, supra note 147, at 1453-56; Matthew Guttman, Reserves of
Strength, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 12, 2002, at B1.
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Jenin had produced some twenty-three successful suicide bombers, as
well as several others apprehended before striking, out of approximately
100 bombers who had struck since the beginning of violence in the fall
of 2000.50 Although formally a refugee camp, the Jenin camp had be-
come an integrated part of the city and, according to Israel, had been
turned into an armed terrorist base.5 ' In stark contrast to the Russian Air
Force's leveling of Grozny,'52 Israel eschewed air force bombing and in-
stead sent reserve infantry to fight from house to house, so as to
minimize civilian casualties. 3 This despite the fact that Israel placed
responsibility for the danger to Palestinian civilians on the gunmen who
perfidiously based themselves in a refugee camp and even used the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) building as a firing
base.'54 Fifty-two Palestinians, many of them armed combatants, and
twenty-three Israeli soldiers were killed during the fighting.55 Early in
the assault, Palestinian officials began to charge that a massacre was tak-
ing place in Jenin 56 and that hundreds of Palestinians had been killed.'
The Security Council approved the Secretary General's initiative to send
a fact-finding mission to Jenin,'58 which never occurred because of a dis-
pute with Israel over its mission and composition.'59 The General
Assembly passed Resolution ES-10/10,' 6° requesting a report from the
150. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide Bombers from Jenin (July 2,
2002) (originally released April 24, 2002), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/.
151. Alan Baker, Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Briefing (Apr. 24,
2002) available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/ [hereinafter Baker Briefing].
152. See sources cited supra note 144; see also IBA Report, supra note 68, at 92 note 5
(detailing several countries' alleged violations of IHL in counterinsurgencies).
153. Asaf Haim, I Couldn't Stand the Lies, MAARIV, Apr. 22, 2002 (trans. Isr. Ministry
of Foreign Affairs) available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/ [hereinafter Zangen].
154. See Baker Briefing, supra note 151.
155. Jenin Report, supra note 147, at 1453.
156. Interview with Ahmad Qurei, President, Palestinian Legislative Council, (Al-
Jazeera television broadcast, Apr. 11, 2002) ("The massacre is bigger than can be described,
and the victims are more than can be counted, and the destruction is more than can be re-
corded.").
157. See Jenin Report, supra note 147, at 1465 (alleging massacre and blaming lack of
evidence on "attempts to move bodies").
158. S.C. Res. 1405, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4516th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1405
(2002) ("Concerned by the dire humanitarian situation of the Palestinian civilian population,
in particular reports from the Jenin refugee camp of an unknown number of deaths and de-
struction") (emphasis in original).
159. See Baker Briefing, supra note 151 (reflecting delay of committee due to ongoing
disagreement as to terms); Suzanne Goldenberg, Israel Blocks U.N. Mission to Jenin, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2002, at 1.
160. This resolution bore the conclusory tide, "Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory." U.N. GAOR, 10th emergency
spec. sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/10 (2002) ("Gravely concerned in par-
ticular at the reports of grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed in the
Jenin refugee camp and other Palestinian cities by the Israeli occupying forces...") (emphasis
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Secretary General. The Secretary General's report confirmed what eve-
ryone knew by then,16 ' that no massacre had taken place.
16
1
Israel had tried to apply the fundamental message of IHL,163 using in-
fantry in place of air power 64 and not firing indiscriminately,' 65 and
suffered substantial loss of life.'6 Having done this, and perceiving an
enemy whose fighters used human shields from among their own peo-
ple,'67 who engaged in perfidy,6' and whose method of warfare focused
on the deliberate killing of civilians, 69 Israel was charged with atroci-
ties.7 If one examines from Israel's point of view its options, in the face
of a hive of terrorist activity, deliberately placed among the most vulner-
able civilians (who, even if they supported the terrorists' activities,
presumably did not ask to be used as human shields), in the face of nu-
merous terrorist attacks 7' and in the face of, the collapse of the Oslo
regime,' one wonders what more could have been done. Israel was
shocked at the disregard the world showed for the moral conduct of its
soldiers, at the allegations, and at the willingness of so many to
in original). The General Assembly has not always been friendly toward Israel. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th sess., supp. No. 34, at 83-84, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3379 (1975)
(repealed 1991) (equating Zionism with racism).
161. Matthew Guttman, Human Rights Watch: No Evidence of Massacre in Jenin, JERU-
SALEM POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at 2 (quoting Peter Bouckaert, senior researcher for Human Rights
Watch); Sharon Sadeh, How Jenin Battle Became a 'Massacre,' GUARDIAN, May 6, 2002, at 7.
The Annexes to the Report, however, particularly that of Jordan, contain horrific allegations,
some explainable as error, others pure fantasy. This was not a case, as the famous Boston
Massacre was, of undisputed facts being overemphasized. Atrocities were alleged; they simply
had not occurred.
162. Jenin Report, supra note 147, at 1455 56; see also Press Release, Isr. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Israel's Reaction to the UN Secretary General's Report on Jenin (Aug. 1,
2002), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/ (expressing gratification at having been vindicated
and promising examination of related humanitarian concerns).
163. See supra Part IV.B.2.
164. See Guttman, supra note 149.
165. Id.
166. See Zangen, supra note 153; Jenin Report, supra note 147, at 1455 [ 58.
167. See Baker Briefing, supra note 151 (stating that the Palestinian gunmen had turned
the refugee camp "into an armed terrorist encampment").
168. Id.
169. Haberman, supra note 122.
170. See Jenin Report, supra note 147, Annexes 1,3,4.
171. See Suicide Bombers, supra note 150.
172. Judith Miller, Yasir Arafat, Palestinian Leader and Mideast Provocateur Is Dead at
75, N.Y. TtMEs, Nov. 12, 2004, at C10.
173. Zangen, supra note 153.
174. U.N. envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, a friend of Arafat's and the husband of Norway's
ambassador to Israel, toured Jenin and described the scene as the worst disaster he and his
men had ever seen, and proclaimed on the basis of the scene that Israel had lost its moral le-
gitimacy. Michael Freund, Terje's Act of Larseny, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at 8,
available at http://www.upjf.org/documents/showthread.php?s=&threadid=l165 (accessed
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believe them.'75 Given Israel's predisposition to look inward for its moral
basis,176 however, and in light of its history of being singled out in the
international "legal" arena,177 the effect of these allegations on Israel's
behavior is not clear.
B. Targeted Killings
In the first days of the so-called Al-Aqsa Intifada, as children and
youths were throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers
guarding roads and checkpoints, gunmen stood behind the children and
fired at the soldiers. 179 In the ensuing fire, children were often hit 8  What
were the soldiers to do to protect themselves so that they could continue
to man the checkpoints that were supposed to keep suicide bombers
from Israeli cities?' Snipers were posted near likely flashpoints, 2 to
shoot the gunmen while avoiding the children who seemingly willingly
shielded them. 8 3 Palestinians charged that this was illegal, inhumane,
extrajudicial killing.'8 4 Israel sees the subtext to be a demand that it roll
over and play dead.'
Like snipers shooting gunmen who hide behind children, targeted
killings of terrorists are low-intensity urban warfare's version of a mili-
tary strike on a purely military target.8 6 Terrorists, whether foot-soldiers
4/19/05); BBC News, Jenin Camp 'Horrific Beyond Belief (Apr. 18, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ middleeast/1937387.stm.
175. See, e.g., Zangen, supra note 153 (eyewitness account of Israeli doctor who treated
both Israelis and Palestinians, both sick and injured, and came forward in anger in light of the
accusations).
176. See supra note 132.
177. See supra note 136.
178. Weiner, supra note 121, at 51; Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Ritual Sacrifice,
N.Y TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A27.
179. Weiner, supra note 121, at 51-52.
180. Id. at 44, 51.
181. See Isabel Kershner, The Fence Mender, JERUSALEM REP., Apr. 19, 2004, at 20.
182. Arieh O'Sullivan, Following Palestinian Live Fire: IDF Starts Using Heavier
Weapons, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 2, 2000, at 3.
183. Weiner, supra note 121, at 51-52.
184. Ze'ev Schiff, Israel is Not Allowed to Defend Itself, HAARETZ ENG.,
Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?
itemNo=413074. Snipers, which should be the darling of IHL because they generally cause no
collateral damage, are vilified in public discourse, perhaps because they are so effective. The
United States has also been criticized for using snipers. See Randa Takieddine, Where are the
Arabs?, DAR AL HAYAT ENG., Apr. 21, 2004 ("In Iraq, the American army went as far as using
snipers; just like militias and pirates do."), available at http://english.daralhayat.com/OPED/
04-2004/Article-20040421-0e6524bc-cOa8-Oled-0029-bea310603e74/story.html.
185. Schiff, supra note 184.
186. On targeted killings generally, see Orna Ben-Naftali & Iceren R. Michaeli, 'We
Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted
Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233 (2003).
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prepared to blow themselves up, or perverse pied pipers who send youths
to kill themselves along with women and children, should be treated no
better than combatants,'87 legitimate targets under the laws of war.'88 Tar-
geted killing hits those necessary, legitimate targets, while minimizing
civilian casualties. 189 While prohibited in peacetime (as a denial of due
process), 19" however, they must also be viewed as a viable alternative to,
or mitigation of, measures that cause collective suffering.'9'
In early 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced a plan
to evacuate all Jewish settlements in Gaza and also to withdraw IDF sol-
diers from the strip. 92 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, a
terrorist organization dedicated to Israel's destruction'93 that is also a
welfare agency, painted Israel's withdrawal as a victory for terrorism,
reminiscent of the way that Hizbullah capitalized on Israel's withdrawal
187. See Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Combatants, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 668
(1992) (combatants are those privileged to engage in armed conflict).
188. As opposed to civilians.
189. The assassination of Shehadeh is an exception, in which a miscalculation resulted
in damage to neighboring buildings and a relatively high number of civilian casualties. See
James Bennet, A Hamas Chieftain Dies When Israelis Attack His Home, N.Y. TmEs, July 23,
2002, at Al. This section is about assassination generally, not about the level of acceptable
collateral death, and is not a defense of the Shehadeh assassination.
190. See Brenda L. Godfrey, Note, Authorization to Kill Terrorist Leaders and Those
who Harbor Them: An International Analysis of Defensive Assassination, 4 SAN DIEGo INT'L
L.J. 491, 493 (2003) (discussing due process implications of targeting terrorist leaders).
191. Palestinian activists are fond of referring to closures and checkpoints as "collective
punishment." See, e.g., Arafat Gives Thanks for Japan's Aid, JIJl PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Sept.
12, 1996. The checkpoints and closures are not "collective punishment" since they are im-
posed for preventative rather than punitive purposes. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Collective
Punishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 645 (1992) (defining collective punishment
as "a punitive sanction[s]"). They do cause suffering to innocent people, however. See Richard
Bernstein, Sharon Threatens to Impose Split on Palestinians, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at
A20 ("mounting criticism in Israel that the government's security policies have caused suffer-
ing among the Palestinians"). House demolitions are more accurately termed collective
punishment, though a case can be made that they are meant to neutralize financial incentives
to commit terrorist acts. See Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research,
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, The Legality of House Demolitions Under
International Humanitarian Law (2004), available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/opt/pdfs/
briefing3403.pdf. In any event, house demolitions are the topic of many other papers, but not
of this one. See, e.g., Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses as a Punitive
Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 871
(2003); Shane Darcy, Punitive House Demolitions, the Prohibition of Collective Punishment,
and the Supreme Court of Israel, 21 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 477 (2003); Emanuel Gross,
Democracy's Struggle Against Terrorism: The Powers of Military Commanders to Decide
Upon the Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of Curfews, Blockades, Encirclements and the
Declaration of an Area as a Closed Military Area, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165 (2002).
192. See James Bennet, Shift on Settlements: Sharon's 'Painful' Course, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
4, 2004, at A6.
193. See Bennett, supra note 133, at Al.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
from southern Lebanon. 94 Not content to strike with words, Yassin or-
dered a spate of terrorist attacks, to underscore the Israeli withdrawal
under fire, including an attack at the port of Ashdod that killed several
people. 195 Israel fired a missile from a helicopter, hitting Yassin's car in
the street in Gaza City and killing him.' 96 His replacement at the head of
Hamas, Abdel-Aziz Rantisi, promised large-scale terrorist attacks 97 and
may have sought help from Hizbullah and Iran towards that end.' 98 Israel
killed him as well."9 Time will tell whether Hamas is weakened, whether
attacks are thwarted.2°°
The international response was deafening. In the wake of Yassin's
killing,20' Israel was hit with condemnation from every corner.2°2 Perhaps
most galling to Israel, however, were the statements that termed the as-
sassination "terror."20' 3 Even the United States condemned the killing,
194. See Aluf Benn, Yassin: Israel Fleeing Gaza, its Attempts to Crush Hamas Failed,
HAARETZ ENG. ED., Mar. 17, 2004.
195. See James Bennet, Suicide Bombers Kill 10 in Israel, and Derail Prime Ministers'
Talks, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al.
196. James Bennet, Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike, N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2004, at Al.
197. See Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi, TiMEs (London), Apr. 19, 2004, Features, at 25.
198. Alex Fishman, Its Leaders Liquidated, Hamas Looks to Tehran for Guidance on
Terror, FORWARD, Apr. 21, 2004, available at http://www.forward.com/main/article.php?
ref=fishman200404211119.
199. Greg Myre, Leader of Hamas Killed by Israel in Missile Attack, N.Y TIMES, Apr.
18, 2004, at Al.
200. See Bradley Burston, Hamas' Clock: The Pressure for a Bloodbath, HAARETZ
ENG. ED., Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/Print
ArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=413334 (explaining Sharon's 'gambit' as putting pressure on Hamas
to respond and not letting it respond and thereby weakening its standing among Palestinians
together with its ability to kill). Many also expressed the opinion that while the hit was not
illegal, it was a bad idea, likely to cause more attacks. See, e.g., David Horovitz, Editorial, But
Was it Wise?, JERUSALEM REP., Apr. 19, 2004, at 3 (worrying also about rising anti-Semitism,
especially if Hamas attacked United States in retaliation); see also Reuven Pedatzur, Sniping
at Morality, HAARETZ ENG. ED., Mar. 19, 2004 (warning that assassination policy is "further
slide down the moral slope") available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/
pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=406446. As this Note goes to press, it appears that Hamas
has either been weakened or induced to change its behavior, whether as a result of the killing
of Yassin and Rantisi, or the decreased support for attacks against civilians following Arafat's
death, or some combination of the two.
201. In stark contrast to the relative quiet that greeted Russia's assassination of Dzhok-
bar Dudayev, the Chechen leader, whom the Russian army found by tracking the phone on
which he was trying to negotiate a cease-fire. See Robert A. Pape, Editorial, A Surgical Strike
that Could Backfire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at 23 (citing trickery).
202. Britain, France Condemn Killing (Reuters), N.Y TIMES, March 22, 2004, available at
http:llwww.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/intemational/middleeast/22WIRE-REAX.htnil; La Com-
mission des Droit de l'Homme de I'ONU Condamne Isradl, LE MONDE, Mar. 24, 2004 ("La
texte 'condamne vigoureusement les graves violations des droits de l'homme dans les terri-
toires palestiniens occup6s, en contradiction avec la IVe Convention de Gen~ve.' ").
203. The European Parliament and the Government of Turkey both accused Israel of
terrorism/acts of terror in connection with the execution. Sharon Sadeh, IDF Actions that
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although it pursues an identical policy with regard to the al Qaida leader-
ship (and without any meaningful consideration of collateral civilian
casualties).2'
Lest one think that Yassin was particularly pitiable because he used a
wheelchair, Rantisi's assassination, coming on the heels of his publicly
threatening terrorist attacks 5 (that there should be no doubt of his mili-
tary as opposed to purely political role), was met with a similar response,
perhaps compounded this time by resentment that foreign outrage had
not changed Israeli policy.2 6 In addition to the questionable international
Harm Civilians Akin to 'Acts of Terror,' HAARETZ ENG. ED., Apr. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo--411538; Turkey
Says Yassin Assassination Was an Act of Terror (News Agencies), HAARETZ ENG. ED.,
Mar. 25, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?
itemNo=408757. But see Johannes Gerster, A Double Standard in the War on Terror,
HAARETZ ENG. ED., Apr. 1, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.comlhasenlobjects/pages/
PrintArticleEn.jhtnl?itemNo=411076. Defining terrorism/terror is controversial. See IBA
Report, supra note 68, at 2; Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 845 (vol. 4); Thilo Marauhn, Addendum 1999, id. at 849. Britannica
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Gaza, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A 1; James Bennet, Sharon's 'Big Bang,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2004, at 6.
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legal basis for these charges,2°7 the essence of the complaints seemed to
208many in Israel to be that Israel could not defend its citizens and most
certainly should not think creatively in its dealings with the problem of
terrorists surrounding themselves with civilians. The message was re-
ceived loud and clear: no matter what you do, you cannot win.2
Whether this perception resulted in worse humanitarian conditions is
a difficult empirical question. If there is not a difference in tactics used
because of the impossibility of compliance, however, then the criticisms
themselves presumably did not have any effect, except to the extent they




Israel is a unique country, not only in its isolation
21  and insecurity,212
but also in the way it strives to maintain a moral code, 213 and in which,
particularly recently, it has come to value "enemy" lives in a way that the
United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, simply does not.
14
Israel has persisted in adhering to its own moral strictures, even as the
world announces that she has lost her right to exist."' Certainly, in the
l'assassinat d'Abdelaziz al-Rantissi, estimant qu'il s'agissait d'une action 'ill6gale, injustifi6e
et contre-productive.'" The rest of the E.U. condemned the action as well.
Arab outrage took on "epic" proportions. See, e.g., Abdulwahab Badrakhan, Licensed As-
sassination, DAR AL HAYAT ENG., Apr. 19, 2004 (column expressing anger and bewilderment
that the "U.S. does not seem to understand that Yassin, Rantissi and the other martyrs' terror is
defense of their land and a resistance to the occupation," and comparing the assassinations to
the movie "The Passion of the Christ," absolving the U.S. because it 'knows not what it
does.'). But see Hazem Saghieh, More than 'Anger,' DAR AL HAYAT ENG., Apr. 21, 2004 ("We
are among the angry, not because Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Dr. Abdulaziz Al Rantisi were
assassinated, but primarily because of the dreadful, very dreadful situation which justice and
rights have ended up in.") both available at http://english.daralhayat.coml.
207. See Dershowitz, supra note 204.
208. See Schiff, supra note 184.
209. Id.
210. Any close attention, however, could be expected to have the same effect, even with-
out making legal judgments. See supra Part III.
211. Israel has diplomatic relations with only two of its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan.
See Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's Diplomatic Missions Abroad:
Status of Relations, Mar. 5, 2004, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/
Diplomatic+missions/Israel-s%20Diplomatic%2OMissions%2OAbroad.
212. Supra note 119.
213. Supra note 132.
214. See, e.g., discussion of Jenin, supra Part V.A.; see also Ford, supra note 55.
215. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Graffiti on History's Walls, 135:15 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. 44 (Nov. 3, 2003); Stanley Fish, The Free Speech Follies, CHRON. HIGHER ED.,
June 13, 2003, at 3 (citing statements by Tom Paulin); G.A. Res. 3379, supra note 160 (equat-
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case of Israel, the abuse of international law for political purposes has
not resulted in a complete disregard for humanitarian concerns. The oc-
cupation has produced a humanitarian disaster, but not as a result of the
use of disproportionate force, as was the case in Chechnya and else-
where. Still, the analysis laid out in Part III, and brought out again at the
end of Part V, makes sense: if international legal criticism is meant to
affect incentives, it must leave a path for the targeted State to take with-
out failing to protect its citizens.
The question remains, however, as more countries are threatened by
global terrorism, what the role of international law in diplomacy should
be. Should it be a dispassionate, apolitical interpretation of passionate,
political texts? Should it be a European regulatory regime in which every
detail of military action is regulated, as if armies were telecoms? Should
it ban all objectionable behavior, failing to recognize a hierarchy of
rights, a balancing of competing evils? Should it purport to ban war,
even though no mechanism is capable of enforcing that? Or should it
operate within the world in which we live, trying to alleviate suffering,
promoting peace where possible, and avoiding atrocities where war is
inevitable?
I profoundly hope that international law takes this last path. Aspira-
tional laws have their place, but if international lawmaking turns into a
non-governmental campaign to pass only aspirational laws, if those laws
are then used as a club with which to beat well-meaning nations-while
the worst human rights abusers not only escape reprimand, they some-
times chair the Human Rights Commission-international law will lose
its legitimacy, at least in the countries it has unjustly targeted. These are
the places where it needs legitimacy. It is ironic that international law's
lack of enforcement structure made States acquiesce to all sorts of rules
restricting their behavior, and now those very restrictions are part of the
reason that they fight against an effective enforcement structure.216
So if you want to kill international law, bring out the NGOs and the
States without meaningful armies, the States that do not face terrorist
threats and those who brutally suppress them, and let them make a series
of rules that, at least in times of danger, no one will obey. Rogue States
Nazis, TLIMEs (London), Mar. 1, 2002, at "Home News"; Adel Darwish, Arab Outrage, TIMES
(London), Apr. 19, 2002, at 'Features;' Tony Judt, Israel: the Alternative, 50:16 N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, OCT. 23, 2003 ("Israel ... is an anachronism"), available at http://
www.nybooks.comlarticles/16671. Israel is the only country whose "right to exist" is dis-
cussed with any frequency.
216. On U.S. objections to the ICC, see Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to
the International Criminal Court, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 19 (2003); John Seguin,
Denouncing the International Criminal Court, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85 (2000).
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benefit from having laws on the books that are not obeyed by others,
because it gives them a defense when they act illegally.
Instead, let us ground the law not only in abstract justice, but in real-
ity as well. Let us insist that the operation of no law should serve to deny
a State the right to protect its citizens against those who do not follow
the same rules. Let us insist that rules have goals and that they achieve
them-and hamstringing national armies to aid "liberation" guerillas and
terrorists is not a worthy goal in a world where colonial conflicts have
ended and only national conflicts remain. Let us give States the tools
they need to quash the terrorist threat and protect their own citizens,
while giving them meaningful, realistic guidance to protect those civil-
ians who might otherwise suffer as a result of those defensive actions.
The terrorist threat is real and it is growing. States will try to protect
their citizens and many will do so militarily. If international law is not to
go the way of the League of Nations, it must be effective not only as a
curb, but also as a tool. International law must adapt to the realities we
face, so that it may remain legitimate and viable; so that States are not
forced to reject it; so that we do not return to the horrors of Dresden or
Nanking; so the terrorists do not win.
217. See BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 5 ("by the 1980's there remained no part of the
world that was under unwilling colonial domination by Europeans").
[Vol. 26:869
